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Abstract 
The article presents an overview of the history of the idea of dialogics and lib-
erty of expression. This liberty is strictly tied to the problem of liberty of con-
science. Since the 17th century, the development of the dialogics traveled from 
an apocalyptic – and demonising its opponents – discourse as in John Milton’s 
approach in Areopagitica, through dialogics of cooperation and obligations and 
laws (in the Polish Brethren, so-called Socinians, especially Jan Crell), through 
dialogics of deduction (transcendental deduction in Immanuel Kant), to dialog-
ics of induction and creativity (John Stuart Mill).
Key words: liberty of conscience, liberty of expression, Enlightenment, history 
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AREOPAGITICA BY JOHN MILTON  
AND THE APOCALYPTIC AND MARKET DIALOGICS (1644)
The best starting point of my analysis is John Milton’s Areopagitica from 
1644, which not only concerns liberty and freedom of speech, but also is 
the most famous and most extensive prose work of Milton, who has be-
come world famous, above all, due to his poetry (Tazbir, 1973, p. 111).
The text was published on November 23, 1644, without a license, with-
out registration, without the identification of the publisher and printer, and 
was the first English text entirely devoted to freedom of speech and pub-
lishing. The fact that responsibility was taken for the “free word” of the 
author, who allowed himself to be identified on the title page is critical. 
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In this treatise (although formally the pamphlet is defined as a speech, 
it was never presented to parliament, contrary to the information on the 
title page), the relationship of the philosophy of mind and social philoso-
phy seems to be its most interesting aspect. Books, according to Milton, 
are a material record of reasoning and disputation. They not only record all 
opinions and arguments, but also cover the truth in the form of correct ev-
idence and proven facts in the record that people can see. Thus: “he who 
kills a man, kills a rational creature, the image of God; but the one who de-
stroys a good book, kills the mind itself, destroys the image of God, just as 
he appears in the living eye” (Milton, 1644). In the context of a discussion 
on dialogue, one cannot overestimate such a bold and modern approach 
to this issue. This perspective anticipates Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 
in a very sharp metaphorical way, a novel in which people become indi-
vidual books because they have learned them by heart. However, the mat-
ter is more serious, especially in the context of a more modern discourse 
about the birth of the public sphere. The presupposed vision of the “mind 
of books” according to Milton is a vision of public reason, which comprises 
reasoning and debating, and possessing a discursive mind. It is important 
that the truth according to Milton is dispersed and fragmented. Habermas 
himself recalls Milton’s Areopagitica in his post-doctoral thesis when he 
talks about the progress of postulating Mill’s concept of freedom of speech 
(Habermas, 2007, p. 267). The killing of a single mind (or the mutilation of 
the body – its material carrier) is not as sinister and fateful as the censor-
ship of books because books are a space embodying public reason, having 
a divine sanction in this version. It is no anachronism to see Milton’s antici-
pation of the concept of the mind as a dialogue, as well as Habermas’ idea 
of communicative reason (see Pask, 2004, and Guss, 1991).
It is very characteristic that Milton is also radical in the conclusions of 
his treatise, where he writes: “Let Truth and False grapple with each other” 
(Milton, 1644). He puts free and open experience above all else. Protestant 
individualism and the autonomy of the individual in confrontation with tra-
dition and doctrine are significant, while the living dialogue of the believer 
with the Scriptures may foster the truth. Indeed, even the pamphlet itself 
is the result of a dialogue: “Even Moses or Paul learned from the Egyp-
tians, from pagans, if not for such a free exchange, the sacred truth of 
the scriptures would not be shaped” (Milton, 1644). Therefore, “the real 
truth” of the Scriptures is not equal to monologue stone inscriptions, but 
the vivid dialogue of the saints with God – and a horrendous one with 
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pagans! Milton drew the correct conclusions from Luther’s determination 
in the dispute with tradition: although for both the Scripture is the most 
crucial point of reference, for Milton the Holy Bible itself is also the result 
of a dispute.
However, it is also worth noting that this dialogue of various truths is, 
in essence, a dialogue of truth and falsehood, from which drama is under-
stood as an existential tension between values, not as a genre. If we take 
a closer look at Areopagitica and Milton’s other writings, the metaphori-
cal conceptualisation presupposed by his discourse is outlined inconsis- 
tently: on the one hand, it suggests the libertarian dialogue of the nascent 
market of ideas in the public space, with this conceptualisation forming 
a dialogical free marketplace of ideas. On the other hand, this very in-
tense existential tension between the values of truth and falsehood sug-
gests a kind of discourse derived from entirely different registers, from the 
apocalyptic millenarian genre. This tension comprises a register where 
the principle is obvious: from sharp opposition and a fierce battle be-
tween the two elements, good and evil, or, as in Areopagitica, the struggle 
between truth and falsehood. Here, one may see a peculiar dramatic de-
bate that finds its counterpart in Milton’s other writings, in the dialectics 
of Ramus’s logic. The inconsistency of this conceptualisation stems from 
Milton’s religious commitment and historical context: during the Crom-
wellian revolution in England, the apocalyptic discourse was quite natural 
(Hill, 1972). This discourse is probably also responsible for the very pointed 
exclusion of Catholics from the area of  tolerance: an apocalyptic beast in 
the form of the papacy cannot be tolerated if it is behind not only a secu-
lar power with a universal reach, but also Satan as the embodiment of evil. 
Such a reconstruction of Milton’s way of thinking is conjecture based on 
the context of his occurrence in the times in which he lived. The apoca-
lyptic conceptualisation is not a worldview profile which is possible to rec-
oncile with the prospect of market negotiations, where the grand discur-
sive strategy is flexibility in negotiation: in the Polish language the words 
“to bargain”, “to haggle” (pol. targować się) constitute a great metaphor, 
or rather metonymy. Bargaining cannot be reconciled with the discourse 
of apocalyptic destruction, the reasoning for haggling not being consis tent 
with the ambivalent elevation of the sublimity of prophecy. Apocalyptic 
logic constitutes dialogics in the literal sense because it is the logic of two 
opposing values and worlds. In this sense, the apocalyptic dialogue re-
sembles the dialectic of Ramus’s concept of opposition, whose supporter 
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and translator, as well as propagator, was John Milton. It may be surpris-
ing that traces of such a dialogue of these two main values may also be 
found in Bakhtin’s concept of carnival (Bachtin, 1975, Bolecki, 1999, Szahaj, 
1996). The war between fasting and carnival is based on the logic of op-
positions and is a kind of apocalyptic logic, which is best seen in the visual 
arts and literature, in which the aesthetic quality of the grotesque marks 
this motif. Similarly, the logic of carnival warring with fasting may be found 
in an author writing much earlier than Bakhtin, namely Lord Shaftesbury, 
whose view was that prophetic enthusiasm opposes the test of ridicule 
and satire (Płuciennik, 2006). This topic is best summarised in the meta-
phor of “Bartholomew’s Fair” that is the conceptualisation of the market 
and democratic satire for the prophetic-apocalyptic rapture, especially 
when mentioning the possible relationship of this Shaftesbury metaphor 
with Jonson’s drama, satirising the righteous and just ecstasy of the Puri-
tans. “Bartholomew’s Fair” is the embodiment of theatre and literature, 
elements that are already democratic, but still rooted in the premodern 
world of apocalyptic struggles. 
In Milton’s treatise, therefore, it would be necessary to perceive an in-
termediate stage between folk-apocalyptic and carnival culture and an 
entirely free marketplace of ideas (“market”) and civic culture. We have 
here a metaphorical image of the “Chapel” struggling with the “Church” 
(as in the Church of England, but it is just metaphorical). Such metonymies 
may be used in English culture: dissenters, meaning the smaller “chapel”; 
and the Anglican church meaning “the church” sensu stricto. The metaphor 
uses the categories of thinking characteristic of carnival culture, the fair-
ground area, embedded strongly into other areas of culture, such as a feu-
dal church or mansion. Sharp opposition occurs as a result of the fact that 
the category of identity becomes discordant and dissident. A subject who 
achieves their identity through the negation of inertia, namely inertia of 
the semantic structure, places himself or herself in the opposite and in dif-
ferentiation of the the proper force. The margin becomes the centre, and 
dislocation is subject to what is being repulsed and unwanted. Interesting-
ly, we connect this state of English culture with a short period in Poland 
after the Warsaw Confederation, when the words “dissident”, “dissenter” 
did not refer to the followers of non-Catholic churches, but only deter-
mined all faithful Christians. It was only due to the influence of the facts of 
violating the Confederation agreement that the Polish “chapel” was sharp-
ly opposed to the “church”. The issue of discussions concerning freedom 
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of conscience in Poland is self-imposed as Milton was indirectly involved 
in this discussion. As Janusz Tazbir writes:
The atmosphere of religious disputes, accompanying the English Revolution, 
meant that the views of the Polish Brethren on the subject of freedom of con-
science and the role of reason in assessing the truths of faith arouse special 
interest in their timeliness and intellectual innovation. The works of Samuel 
Przypkowski and other Arian writers were well known to the creators of the 
concept of freedom of conscience in England. One man who was interested in 
the Socinian views there, was, among others, John Milton, author of the poem 
Paradise Lost; he was also involved in the printing of the Racovian Catechism, 
which appeared secretly in England in 1652. The treatise of John Crell On the 
Freedom of Conscience (the original English title of the 1646 translation is 
A learned and exceeding well-complied Vindication of Liberty of Religion) was 
twice translated into French; it also appeared in the Dutch language, it also 
had a few Latin editions. All these editions were printed in Amsterdam (Tazbir 
1973, p. 111).2
Confusion regarding the case of Milton in his relationship with the Pol-
ish Brethren consisted of the fact that while he had power to be genuinely 
censorial, he allowed the publication of such anti-Trinitarian, unorthodox 
writings. However, the issue of the liberty of conscience was vital to him, 
as is also demonstrated by the dissenter character of the Westminster 
Confession, with which Milton may also be identified. One of the crucial 
points of this confession is Chapter 20 on Christian liberty and freedom 
of conscience (Pasek, 1999, p. 115). This point, moreover, has become 
a contentious issue concerning so-called independents, or the separation 
of Congregationalist churches which issued the so-called Savoy Declara-
tion in 1658 (A Declaration of the Faith and Order . . . 1658). Subsequently, 
the cause of freedom of conscience became the source of conflict, leading 
pilgrims from England to become founders of the New World in America. 
This is why this treatise on the freedom of conscience by one of the Polish 
Brethren is of such crucial importance in this context.
2 All translations come from the author of the article unless indicated otherwise.
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FOR LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE (A LEARNED AND EXCEEDING 
WELL-COMPLIED VINDICATION OF LIBERTY OF RELIGION)  
BY JOHN CRELL (1637) – MARKETPLACE DIALOGUE  
AND 17Th CENTURY ENLIGHTENMENT
Unlike in England, where Milton still used the language of anti-Catholic 
confrontation, the situation appeared different in the case of the Socin-
ians in Poland, that is the so-called Polish Brethren (Ogonowski, 1991, 
Szczucki & Tazbir, 1959, Tazbir, 1973). In their treatises, they focused on 
the issues of tolerance and liberty of conscience. Here, various non-con-
frontational regulators of public discourse are cited. They do not postu-
late absolute freedom of speech (one can hardly know for sure what this 
should be), but propose, on the one hand, regulations entirely different 
from such cruel solutions as persecution and censorship, and, on the oth-
er hand, from apocalyptic and satirical negation. Their conceptualisation 
appears entirely as subject to marketplace discourse, as “bargaining” and 
negotiating. The concept is most apparent in the treatise For the Liberty 
of Conscience [A learned and exceeding well-complied Vindication of Lib-
erty of Religion] by Jan Crell, who was famous all over Europe and whose 
work was published four times in the 17th century (in 1637, 1650, 1666, and 
in 1681) (Crell, 1957). He probably had a major influence on the creation 
of John Locke’s Enlightenment Letters [A Letter Concerning Toleration]. In 
Crell’s treatise, one may find anticipations of Kantian and Enlightenment 
solutions. Crell invokes excerpts of Holy Scripture, pointing to the principle 
of reciprocity: “Do that to no man which thou hatest” (this probably comes 
from the canonical Book of Tobit (4:15) unaccepted by Protestants), or “do 
to others what you would have them do to you” (Matthew 7:12). These 
arguments are to justify the principle of Catholic and Protestant co-opera-
tion: if Catholics have sworn not to obey to the principle, they cannot sim-
ply revoke this oath as they have promised to honour it. Here, we can see 
the conceptualisation of the full marketplace dialogue: we have in this pas-
sage of the treatise a dialogue designed for honesty and fidelity, an amica-
ble commitment and promise, a dialogue of trust, discourses based on the 
communicative principle of cooperation and reciprocity. It should be noted 
that the concept of Paul Grice’s principle of co-operation three centuries 
later is derived from the fully conceived concept of John Austin’s discourse 
(criticism accused the bourgeois prejudices against literature and theatre). 
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This oath dialogue is, at the same time, a dialogue of ritual bonds. Specific 
rites create commitments and networks and systems based on trust. The 
haggling discourse, which is not blind faith, and chooses equal negotiation 
of at least two sides, not only is an anti-apocalyptic discourse but also has 
the power to create social bonds, not to say society as a whole. This dis-
course means the equality of its subjects. Equality, however, is also a dimi-
nution of self-confidence. Zbigniew Ogonowski, in his introduction to Crell’s 
treatise, writes that the Socinians found a natural scepticism associated to 
historicism. Thus, Samuel Przypkowski simply stated that although we are 
convinced of the truth of our truth, who will say for sure that we are not 
going astray. Socinus himself claimed that no one has the key to the truth 
(Ogonowski, 1991). Milton, with his concept of scattered and fragmented 
truth, would fit into this context. In the plan of the Polish Brethren, there 
is already an outline of a secular state, while for Milton, there is still a mar-
riage of state and religion: “A spiritual and perfect religion, this reaches for 
what a person thinks and feels – without violence” (Crell, 1957, p. 42).
My interpretation of these writings by Crell indicates that Enlighten-
ment concepts of public reason were born in the 17th century, not only in 
the 18th century, when a famous discussion about what enlightenment was 
took place in Germany during its closing years. (I refer to this in the first 
chapter of my book – Płuciennik, 2009, pp. 23–50).
Against this background, the major idea John Locke expressed in A Let-
ter Concerning Toleration is much less radical (Locke, 1963). He disagreed 
unambiguously with the radicalism of the so-called Socinians and anti-Trin-
itarians, even though he was in possession of their writings. However, his 
view of the Christian religion was apparently “nice” to the “chapel”, that is, 
he sympathised with the apostate: 
He, certainly, that follows Christ, embraces His doctrine, and bears His yoke, 
though he forsake both father and mother, separate from the public assem-
blies and ceremonies of his country, or whomsoever or whatsoever else he 
relinquishes, will not then be judged a heretic (Locke, 1963, p. 4).
As if that were not enough, his plan concerning the separation of 
church and state (ibid., p. 7) was outlined with the requirement that “each 
of the mortals” should be free to conduct debates and discuss matters of 
importance to him (ibid., p. 9). It is also important to freely associate with 
“churches” and “chapels” (ibid., p. 11). The state should not use its resolute 
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power beyond those cases that Locke says are outside the limits of tol-
erance: “no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules 
which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated 
by the magistrate” (ibid., p. 53). For Locke, tolerance should also not apply 
to Catholics (because they have a foreign ruler in Rome and want to kill 
the English king) and atheists. The latter have no power over themselves 
and are therefore dangerous. While it must be said that Locke’s vision has 
its limitations, it remains, apart from Crell’s treatise, the foundation of the 
concept of  civil society and the development of the public sphere. Although 
religions outside of Christianity are not taken into account at all, this is due 
to the historical context of the time, as they did not constitute a real civic 
force and were, therefore, not a problem. Freedom of conscience is found 
in the treatises of Crell and Locke and they are very important advocates. 
Moreover, in the short history of dialogics, they constitute milestones to-
wards a full marketplace dialogue based on trust and (self-)scepticism at 
the same time. Both treatises show the emerging ethics of a financial, eco-
nomic and logical account. However, this quality is even more visible at the 
end of the Enlightenment. In this respect, the Polish impact is much more 
valuable than it has been usual to admit in Poland.
WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? BY IMMANUEL KANT 
AND THE POLISH BRETHREN.  
A DIALOGUE OF TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION
I will now look at the brilliant concept of the dialogue of rational intellect 
formulated by Andrzej Wiszowaty (On religion in accordance with rea-
son, 1676), (Wiszowaty, 1960) who was centuries ahead of the solutions 
proposed and refined by Kant (Critique of Judgment, 1790). Leibniz’s log-
ic could, however, probably be considered an intermediary (Huber, 2005, 
Ogonowski, 1991). In Wiszowaty’s book, we find the reason for conduct-
ing a free debate (this directly affects intelligibility; the gibberish and in-
comprehensibility of inspired prophecy are excluded, which is confirmed 
to some extent in the Scriptures). In the concept of Kant, one may see that 
it is practical reason (lat. sensus communis aestheticus) that excludes Car-
tesian egotism (Cascardi, 1999, p. 48, also Cascardi, 1992).
On the one hand, one may find in Kant’s work a suggestion of unlim-
ited freedom, including debate, at least within academic circles, which 
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seems to be quite conservative minimalism today. An academy is not a vol-
untary café association. Thus, in the article What is Enlightenment? (1784) 
(Kroński, 1966) it may be said that trust in mutual relations within the 
framework of democratic bargaining and negotiation discourses must also 
postulate self-confidence, and this will be impossible to achieve without 
the autonomy of the individual. The market enforces equality which eman-
cipates the subjects participating in the negotiations.
A somewhat less frequently quoted text of Kant defining enlighten-
ment is Chapter 40 concerning the part called “Analysis of Sublimity” in 
his Critique of Judgment. This is an excerpt where enlightenment is invoked 
as making one free from superstition (Kant, 2004, pp. 211–212). It only fits 
to summarise Kant’s brief deliberations: he praises individualism and Car-
tesian autonomy and his break with society, family and tradition in spirit. 
however, instead of a Cartesian deus ex machina, Kant proposes a sensus 
communis as a signpost. The maxim of taste requires the extension of its 
subjectivity through a “broader way of thinking”, which allows the individ-
ual to “rise above the individual subjective conditions of the judgment”. At 
the same time, Kant is categorical regarding uniqueness and universality. 
It may be said that Kant’s categorical approach eliminates his recognition 
for subjectivity as he appreciates and negates it at the same time: “feeling 
in the judgment of taste comes to be imputated to everyone, so to speak, 
as a duty” (Kant, 2004, p. 214). Kant’s dialogue is a dialogue of reason with 
transcendental pretensions. In Wiszowaty’s treatise, we have the classic di-
alogic of Aristotle’s deduction, and in Kant the dialogue of transcendental 
deduction, which is a dialogue of autonomy and intersubjective ecstasy, 
going beyond oneself and identifying with others. However, there are oth-
er concepts as a model. In this lies the totalitarian dimension of Kant’s ide-
as, although it is the output towards them, the deflection and openness of 
the presupposition for dialogue rather than the monologue model of the 
mind. The way of thinking in this model is dictated by deduction; there are 
abstract rules regulating dialogue. It is interesting that Wiszowaty excludes 
inspired prophecy based on deductive reason, while Kant leaves the gate 
open for inspired prophecy in the form of a transcendental subject. The 
above-mentioned ecstatic of “expanding” oneself to different perspectives 
is close to the illogicality and babbling of inspired prophets: it is a meta-
phorical speaking in tongues; it is a transgression beyond one’s language; 
a confusion of languages; and introspective polyphony. At this point, one 
may already see the potential of subjective idealism for objectivisation. 
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It is very similar to the subject of transcendental deduction which produces 
an objective spirit. Although Kant’s criticism does not allow this transition, 
when autoscepticism fails, criticism will cease to be the primary signpost, 
and romanticism will be unleashed.
ON LIBERTY (1859), JOHN STUART MILL –  
EVOLUTIONARY INDUCTIVE DIALOGUE
An entirely different model of thinking is found in the next excellent text 
which established, at the same time, another milestone on the “way of 
freedom” – in a treatise entitled On Liberty by John Stuart Mill (1859) after 
the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen had been issued 
(Mill, 2005). Interestingly, Susan Mendus has juxtaposed Locke and Mill, 
awarding the latter strong praise for diversity (Locke argued only for tol-
erating debates and addressed his letter to rulers) (Mendus, 1989, p. 38), 
whereas, for Habermas, the combination of Milton and Mill is important 
(Habermas, 2007, p. 267). If Kant’s view was somehow summarised by the 
18th century, Mill perfectly synthesises the trends of the 19th century. In 
Mill, we find another model for the dialogue of deduction, which is the dia-
logue of the authentic diversity of subjects, as well as being a dialogue of 
creativity: “There is no freedom without diversity” and “there is no crea-
tivity without diversity”. Social discourse is enlightened, and therefore self-
aware and leaning towards another, namely the dialogue of diversity, al-
though the minority should be protected from the tyranny of the majority. 
Moreover, in Habermas’ text this is what he comments: if Milton pleads for 
the public sphere in the face of power, the same educated public sphere 
is the addressee of Mill’s treatise. The space created at the intersection of 
the “chapel” and “church” tends to change into a dictatorship of the ma-
jority. This area must constantly be expanded; one cannot stop progress in 
this regard. Regulation, in the form of endless creativity or inventiveness, 
makes it impossible to silence the truths seemingly wrong today as it is 
unknown what the situation will be in a few or several dozen years away. 
Moreover, if one does not know and if one acknowledges an evolution-
ary way of reaching the truth, society may suffer irreparable damage, ex-
cluding any other points of view. Mill already acknowledged the evolution 
and usefulness of scientific inventions. Hence, this goes beyond the dia-
logue of enlightenment; there is already a dialogue of induction leading to 
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invention and creation. Mill’s social discourse is a dialogue of evolutionary 
induction. The most important of Mill’s developments, however, is that the 
main and only regulator of discourse is the so-called harm principle. Free-
dom possesses a degree of this in the form of the principle of “harming 
another”: you can say anything that does not harm others more or less di-
rectly. Therefore, it cannot be argued that Mill opts for total freedom and 
freedom of speech. Dialogics is limited and regulated, both by the principle 
of creativity and by harm to others. However, it is also vital that Mill re-
calls this harm to others as the most critical regulator, as this constitutes 
an openness to the possibility of establishing a discourse of emancipation 
and, in consequence, one which is critical. I do not think Habermas is right 
when he writes:
Mill demanded not criticism but tolerance, because the dogmatic residues 
could indeed be suppressed but not reduced to the common denominator of 
reason. The unity of reason and of public opinion lacked the objective guaran-
tee of a concordance of interests existing in society, the rational demonstrabil-
ity of a universal interest as such (Habermas, 2007, p. 268).
Although one may agree with the second part of this quote, to state 
that Mill did not demand criticism is unfair as Mill was also a co-author of 
The Subjection of Women and the President of the Society for Women’s 
Suffrage.
In conclusion, it may be argued that the Polish Brethren’s legacy must 
be taken into account when talking about liberal views on freedom. Al-
though their probable influence on the concepts of enlightenment is much 
wider than usually imagined, even if this cannot be confirmed by very 
much evidence, the quality of their reflections are such that it should not 
be excluded from the record of thinking concerning liberty and enlighten-
ment. Thus, they constitute a crucial part of the European liberal tradition 
in Christianity (Płuciennik, 2009, Chapter 1). 
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